A Comparative Introduction to Japanese &(and) United States Wrongful Termination Law by Iwanaga, S. Maya
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 13
Number 2 Winter 1990 Article 7
1-1-1990
A Comparative Introduction to Japanese &(and)
United States Wrongful Termination Law
S. Maya Iwanaga
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
S. Maya Iwanaga, A Comparative Introduction to Japanese &(and) United States Wrongful Termination Law, 13 Hastings Int'l & Comp.
L. Rev. 341 (1990).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol13/iss2/7
A Comparative Introduction to Japanese &
United States Wrongful Termination Law
By S. MAYA IWANAGA
Member of the Class of 1990
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .............................................. 341
II. United States Employment Law ........................... 342
A. A Brief History of United States Employment Law .... 343
B. The Erosion of the At-Will Doctrine .................. 344
1. Legislative Exceptions ............................. 344
2. Judicial Erosion of the At-Will Doctrine ........... 345
a. Contract Theories ............................. 347
b. Tort Theories ................................. 349
C. Current Issues in United States Employment Law ..... 351
III. Japanese Employment Law ................................ 352
A. Background of Japanese Employment Law ............ 352
B. -Sources of Japanese Labor Law ....................... 354
C. Wrongful Discharge in Japan ......................... 357
D . Rem edies ............................................ 361
IV. Comparative Analysis ..................................... 364
V. Conclusion ............................................... 365
I. INTRODUCTION
Business relations between Japan and the United States have led to
an increasing exchange of workers. This exchange has created a practi-
cal need for a simple comparative presentation of the two employment
systems, especially in the confusing area of wrongful termination. An
examination of each country's approach to wrongful termination should
serve as a useful guide for United States and Japanese citizens who work
within each other's employment systems and are justifiably confused as
to what actions are proper in the employee termination setting.
United States courts and legislators also can benefit from an exami-
nation of the two systems. The United States is fast adopting the em-
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ployee-protective approach to wrongful termination embodied in the
Japanese legal system. While United States courts are struggling with
the tension between a traditional rule permitting employee discharges at-
will and a "modem" rule requiring just cause for employee discharges,
the Japanese strive to guarantee permanent or lifetime employment. As
United States courts and legislators move toward a just cause standard,
they can learn from the Japanese in shaping a new system.
This Note will present a brief overview of each system, then high-
light the similarities and differences between the two countries' ap-
proaches to wrongful termination. Attorneys with a basic knowledge of
how the two systems work will be better equipped to advise both Japa-
nese and United States employers regarding their foreign employees.
II. UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT LAW
The United States is the only major industrial nation in the world
that does not offer employees some form of comprehensive protection
against wrongful discharge.1 This stems, in part, from the fact that
"[t]he ability of an employer in the United States to hire and fire employ-
ees has been considered part of the American 'free enterprise system' and
a key to successful business control."2 Indeed, approximately "[seventy-
five] percent of [the United States] one hundred million labor force is
employed under contracts at-will." 3
Despite the lack of general statutory provisions protecting employ-
ees from wrongful discharge, most state jurisdictions have created judi-
cial exceptions to the common-law right of employers to dismiss "at-will
employees" using contract and tort theories.' These jurisdictions vary,
however, in their willingness to modify the traditional doctrine.' For
example, California has significantly modified the at-will doctrine,6 but
New York and New Mexico have made few changes.7
1. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1844 (1980); Mauk, Wrongful Discharge:
The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 202, 204 (1985).
2. Brown, Labor Law Issues Facing Multinational and Japanese Companies Operating in
the United States and the United States Companies Using Japanese-Style Labor Relations:
Agenda Items Under the "New Labor Relations", 8 U. HAW. L. REv. 261, 322 (1986).
3. Mauk, supra note 1, at 204.
4. Brown, supra note 2, at 325.
5. A. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EM-
PLOYMENT DOCTRINE 11 (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, U. Pa., No. 31, 1987).
6. Id.
7. Id. For example, the New York courts have been reluctant to create judicial excep-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp.,
58 N.Y.2d 293, 301, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983) (Despite the trend in
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The rapid and erratic development of employment law in the area of
wrongful discharge has caused much confusion in lower courts and has
left management uncertain about which employee termination actions
are wrongful.8 As a result, a major issue in employment law today is
whether federal and state legislation should directly address this area of
the law, and if so, in what manner.9
California has been at the forefront of those states which have modi-
fied the at-will doctrine10 and moved toward a just cause standard in
wrongful termination cases. As such, California is a natural focus in dis-
cussions regarding where employment law is, and should be, heading.
Accordingly, the following discussion of wrongful termination issues will
emphasize California law.
A. A Brief History of United States Employment Law
During the colonial period, United States courts followed the tradi-
tional English rule: when faced with an indefinite employment period,
the courts would presume the hiring was for one year and require reason-
able notice before either party could terminate the employment relation-
ship. 1 This common law rule continued until the last quarter of the
nineteenth century when United States law split from English law and
developed the employment-at-will doctrine.12 Nineteenth century Amer-
ican law regarding hirings for an indefinite period of time thus lay some-
where between its Anglo-Saxon origins and a new but still confusing,
inconsistent, and not fully articulated law.13
H. G. Wood's 1877 treatise, Master and Servant,14 introduced what
was to become the American employment-at-will doctrine. 5 Specifi-
cally, the treatise stated that "a general or indefinite hiring [was] prima
other jurisdictions of adopting protections for at-will employees, the tremendous impact of
similar "judicial legislating" on New York employment law makes "such a significant change
in our law ... best left to the Legislature."). The New Mexico courts have expressed the same
reluctance to judicially modify the traditional at-will doctrine. See, eg., Bottijliso v. Hutchi-
son Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 794, 635 P.2d 992, 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (Plaintiff's type of
wrongful discharge action for retaliatory discharge was "best evaluated by the legislative
branch and the determination of the appropriate format for such proposed legislative change,
if any, is best weighed by the legislature.").
8. See infra notes 21-88 and accompanying text.
9. See A. HILL, supra note 5, at 11-16.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id at 1.
12. Id
13. Id. at 4.
14. H.G. WooD, A TREATISE OF LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1886).
15. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 5.
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facie a hiring at will" and added that the servant had the burden of dem-
onstrating a yearly hiring. 6 In short, employment for an indefinite term
could be terminated at any time by either party to the agreement for any
or no reason.
17
Once articulated, the rule was "adopted in the United States without
much serious consideration of its theoretical support or potential impact.
It was a legal anomaly, inconsistent with the developing general theory of
contract.""8 However, the doctrine spread and was generally adopted in
every jurisdiction as a principle of common law. 9 California went so far
as to codify the rule in its state code.2"
B. The Erosion of the At-Will Doctrine
1. Legislative Exceptions
In the 1930s the United States Supreme Court began to open the
door for legislative exceptions to the at-will doctrine.2 In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act which prohibited employer coercion or dis-
crimination against employees because of union activity.22 Although the
Court noted that it was creating only a limited, specific exception to the
basic at-will rule,2 3 by upholding the Act "the Court effectively deter-
mined that Congress and the state legislatures [could] limit an employer's
absolute freedom to discharge his employees ... [; that is,] legislatures
could limit ... or modify the at-will rule."24
Since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, both the federal and state govern-
ments have enacted statutory limitations to the at-will doctrine.25 Fed-
16. Id. (citing H.G. WOOD, supra note 14, § 134).
17. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 1.
18. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 135 (1976). Despite the fact that the freedom of contract principle was a powerful force
in late nineteenth century American jurisprudence, Feinman believes it would be theoretically
inaccurate to label the at-will rule as a natural outgrowth of this principle. He suggests that if
freedom of contract were the basis for the at-will rule, the parties' agreements would have been
enforced, with the parties' intentions as the source of law. In short, under "true" nineteenth
century contract law theory, the durations of hirings and notice required would be case by case
determinations, without presumptions of yearly hirings or termination at-will. Id. at 125.
19. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 7.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989). Today, California's codification of the at-will
rule is ironic in light of the fact that the California courts have taken the greatest steps toward
abrogating the at-will doctrine.
21. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 7.
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); A. HILL, supra note 5, at 7.
23. See A. HILL, supra note 5, at 78.
24. Bakaly, Erosion of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. 63, 67 (1982).
25. Id.
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eral limitations include the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,26 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 and the Federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act.28 State limitations include statutes prohibiting
discharge based on political activity or affiliation,29 whistleblower protec-
tion acts prohibiting the discharge of employees who have reported their
employers' violations of the law,30 and provisions prohibiting retaliatory
discharge for filing worker's compensation claims.31 Currently, there is
legislation pending in many states that will prohibit the dismissal of any
employee without just cause.32
Although the above statutory limitations illustrate a growing con-
cern for employee protection, there is a general reluctance to abandon
the at-will doctrine. Employers remain free to hire and fire employees so
long as they do not violate a statutory provision specifically protecting
that class of employees. 33  Thus, approximately seventy-five million
workers remain unprotected by a requirement that employers discharge
them only for just cause.34 These are private sector employees who are
not protected by either statutory law or the just cause provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement.35
2. Judicial Erosion of the At-Will Doctrine
Discharged at-will employees are taking their claims to court.36 A
flood of litigation has been caused by the judicial erosion, over the past
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1983) (prohibiting retaliatory discharges for union or-
ganizing activity).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) (prohibiting employee terminations which discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1983) (prohibiting employee terminations which discriminate
on the basis of age).
29. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1989).
30. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.36 9 (West Supp. 1989).
31. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.4(h) (Supp. 1982).
32. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 16. In California, the proposed bills seek to establish a just
cause standard for termination, but also address the major issues of whether to have
mandatory arbitration requirements and what remedies should be available to plaintiffs. See,
e.g., S. 282, introduced by Sen. Greene, Jan. 26, 1989 (Cal.); S. 222, introduced by Sen. Beverly,
Jan. 19, 1989 (Cal.), amended July 20, 1989; S. 181, introduced by Sen. Torres, Jan. 12, 1989
(Cal.). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted an
Employment Termination Act which would require just cause in terminations of employment
for unspecified durations if the employee has been employed by the employer for more than
one year and would provide for arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act.
33. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 8.
34. Id. at 9 (citing The Employment-At-Will Issue: A BNA Special Report, Daily Labor
Rep. (BNA) No. 225, at 7 (Nov. 19, 1982)).
35. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 8-9.
36. Id. at 9.
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fifteen years, of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. 37 The judi-
ciary thus has been a driving force behind the erosion of the traditional
at-will doctrine.
As of June 1987, forty-two states recognized an exception to the at-
will doctrine and were allowing employee suits for wrongful discharge.38
Ironically, despite California's codification of the at-will doctrine, Cali-
fornia courts have been the most progressive in forging actionable excep-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine.39 California Labor Code
section 2922 provides that "[a]n employment, having no specified term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other."''
This section creates a presumption that an employment relationship is
terminable at the will of either party regardless of whether just cause for
the termination exists.41 Despite this presumption, California law has
become highly protective of the employee, and California juries have
been awarding increasingly large damages to those wrongfully
discharged.42
Judicial exceptions have been created through judicial interpreta-
tions of common-law contract and tort theories although courts have
been ambiguous in distinguishing whether actions lie in contract or in
tort.43 This has led to some confusion regarding the elements of proof
that are necessary to state a cause of action, the types of defenses avail-
able, and the measure of damages that are available."
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. at 55.
40. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
41. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
(1981).
42. See Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EM-
PLOYMENT REL. L.J. 404, 405-06 (1987). Gould states that "[a]lthough there are no precise
statistics available, it is clear that wrongful discharge litigation, which was hardly known in
the 1970s, is increasing geometrically.... The cost of law-suits that respond to a discharge, as
measured by jury awards and settlements, has also increased geometrically and is beginning to
draw concern from the business community." Id. at 405. He goes on to note that "[i]n Califor-
nia, between 1982 and 1986, employees won more than 70 percent of the cases tried before
juries. The average total award was $652,100" with some awards as high as $4.77 million and
$2.337 million. Id. at 405-06 (citation omitted). Gould also cites to a survey compiled by the
San Francisco labor and employment law firm of Schachter, Kristoff, Ross, Sprague and Curi-
ale that illustrates that plaintiff-employees in California wrongful termination suits have re-
ceived punitive damage awards averaging $494,000. Id. at 406. Moreover, "the total award in
these cases were 1,403 percent higher than the defendant's or the company's last settlement
offer." Id. Perhaps more significant, the awards exceeded the employees' lawyers' settlement
demands by 187 percent. Id.
43. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 16.
44. Id. at 17.
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(a) Contract Theories.-Some courts recognize an implied-in-fact
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employer-employee rela-
tionship and impose contract liability on employers. These courts find
sufficient oral or written representations to be convinced that a contrac-
tual obligation exists to terminate only with good cause.45 This implied
obligation takes the employment contract out of the at-will category.4 6
The central issue in these cases is the source of the implied prom-
ise.47 Several courts have found that contracts may arise from personnel
handbooks or manuals.4" These courts find the promises, conditions, and
benefits addressed by employers in handbooks, personnel manuals, and
application forms to be contractually binding to the benefit of the em-
ployee.4 9 The theory of employer liability is that the oral and written
statements of the personnel policy lead to a legitimate expectation of ben-
efits." Thus, the policy is legally enforceable even though the employ-
ment relationship is technically of an indefinite term.51
Other courts have extended the implied promise reasoning, and have
held employers to a just cause standard even when no such protection
45. Brown, supra note 2, at 327. Jurisdictions that have recognized exceptions based
upon contract theories include California, Alabama, Washington, Minnesota, and Michigan.
See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 729-33 (Ala. 1987) (implied
promise to abide by employee manual guidlines contractually enforceable); Pugh, 116 Cal.
App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (employer conduct may give rise to an implied promise
by the employer to discharge plaintiff-employee only for cause); Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 613-17, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892-93 (1980) ("contractual
obligations can be implicit in employer policies and practices"); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (1984) (en banc) (If an employer "creates
an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific
situtations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job" those promises are
enforceable.).
46. Bakaly, supra note 24, at 73.
47. Id.
48. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 19-21. See also Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d at 880
(holding that the Blue Cross personnel manual, stating it was Blue Cross policy to discharge
only for just cause, was sufficient to create an enforceable promise that plaintiff would not be
terminated except for just cause); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d
1257 (1985) (holding that a pharmaceutical company was bound by the provisions of its per-
sonnel policy manual which allowed terminations of its employees only for cause); Duldulao v.
St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987) (holding that an
employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contract rights if it contains
a promise clear enough to give an employee a reasonable belief that an offer has been made, if
it is distributed so the employee knows of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer,
and the employee accepts the offer by beginning or continuing to work after learning of the
policy statement).
49. See A. HILL, supra note 5, at 21.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Mauk, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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appears in the company's personnel materials. 2 These courts find im-
plied promises in the employer's oral assurances of continued employ-
ment as long as the employee performs satisfactorily.53 They look at
factors such as the employee's length of service, commendations and pro-
motions, and established industry practices of retaining senior employees
when reducing the workforce. 4
Another line of contract theory cases applies the principle of an im-
plicit promise to act in good faith in the employment at-will setting."
Although recognition of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts seems to abolish the at-will doctrine completely,
some courts limit the application of the covenant by recognizing that
application of the doctrine must be balanced with the right of the em-
ployer to serve his own legitimate business interests. 6 Under this theory,
not every discharge without cause is a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.5 7 The employee must present evidence of the
employer's misconduct such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 8 A
showing of bad faith is required, and a mere showing of lack of good
cause is insufficient to establish a cause of action for wrongful termina-
tion. 9 Courts may also limit the application of the covenant to certain
types of employment contracts. 60
In contrast, California courts have expressly held that all employ-
52. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 21.
53. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (plaintiff's
justifiable reliance on employer's oral promise not to fire him if he did a good job is evidence
that plaintiff would not be terminated without good cause).
54. Mauk, supra note 1, at 224; see also Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(Plaintiff's 30 years of service and advancement from potwasher to vice president were among
the factors supporting employer's implied promise not to terminate without good cause.).
55. See Brown, supra note 2, 45, 46, 116, at 326-27.
56. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 41, 429 A.2d 492, 494
(1980) ("The application of this doctrine must ... be balanced with the right of an employer to
serve his own legitimate business interests. Accordingly not every discharge made without
cause [is] a breach of the implied covenant .... [T]o [be] a breach... the [employer's conduct]
must constitute 'an aspect of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.' ").
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bakaly, supra note 24, at 77.
60. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-05, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1257 (1977) (Good faith requirement is not necessarily implicit in every contract for employ-
ment at will, but there is a breach of the good faith requirement when a "principal seeks to
deprive the agent of all compensation by terminating the contractual relationship when the
agent is on the brink of successfully completing [a] sale .... [In that case,] the principal has
acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction between the principal and the buyer is to be
regarded as having been accomplished by the agent [citation omitted]. The same result obtains




ment contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.61 Recently, however, in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., the
California Supreme Court limited the recovery in cases claiming breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to contract damages.62 In
so ruling, the Foley Court disapproved the numerous lower court cases
that had allowed tortious recovery for breach of the implied covenant. 63
A few courts also use the related contract theory of promissory es-
toppel" to provide for equitable recovery in wrongful discharge ac-
tions.65 Under promissory estoppel, employers are liable for wrongful
discharge when their employees have detrimentally relied on a promise
or offer by their employers.66 This theory generally has been applied
when an employee resigns from a job in reliance on alternative employ-
ment, and either the offer of new employment is withdrawn or the em-
ployee is terminated shortly after his move.67 The promissory estoppel
argument has been successful in only a few jurisdictions.68
(b) Tort Theories.-The use of tort theory in at-will cases is based
on the principle that important public policies supersede the right to ter-
minate employment-at-will contracts. 69 The courts use tort theory to im-
pose duties on employers from the "outside," as a matter of law,70 rather
than from the "inside," as express or implied agreements between the
parties. In short, the courts allow an employee to recover tort damages
61. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227
(1988) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract im-
poses on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment.") ("The duty to act in good faith has been recognized in the majority of American
jurisdictions, the Restatement, and the Uniform Commercial Code.")).
62. See id. it 700 n.42, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 n.42.
63. Id. 254 Cal.Rptr at 240 n.42. Specifically, the court disapproved Cleary v. American
Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), and its progeny insofar as they
permitted a cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
64. Brown, supra note 2, 45, 46, 116, at 328.
65. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 25.
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 25 (citing Mauk, supra note 1, at 224). In Mauk's article, he cites to Grouse v.
Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (plaintiff entitled to the opportunity to
perform duties to employer's job satisfaction when employee had resigned former job in reli-
ance on offer of new employment that was revoked prior to commencement), and McMath v.
Ford Motor Co., 77 Mich. App. 721, 259 N.W.2d 140 (1977). See also McIntosh v. Murphy,
52 Haw. 112, 469 P.2d 177 (1970).
68. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 25. States recognizing the promissory estoppel argument
include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, North Caro-
lina, and Ohio. See id. app. A.
69. Bakaly, supra note 24, at 67; Brown, supra note 2, at 329.
70. Bakaly, supra note 24, at 67; Brown, supra note 2, at 329.
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for a discharge that violates public policy.7"
The initial problem for courts has been determining an acceptable
definition of the term "public policy."72 Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,7 3 the first and most influential case in this
area, gives some guidance. In Petermann, a union employee was asked
by the union to perjure himself before a legislative investigatory commit-
tee. When the employee gave truthful testimony he was fired. The court
held that the defendant-employer's right to terminate an at-will employee
was limited by public policy considerations.74 The court stated: "By
'public policy' is intended that principle of law which holds that no citi-
zen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good . . . [;] whatever contravenes good
morals or any established interests of society is against public policy."75
Although the Petermann court found the wrongful discharge to be a
breach of contract, courts have extended Petermann to tort, making pu-
nitive damages available to plaintiffs.76
Cases following Petermann provide some additional guidance re-
garding the sources of public policy.77 According to these cases, public
policy may be found in legislative enactments; administrative agencies'
rules, regulations, or-decisions; and judicial decisions. 78 More specifi-
cally, these cases find liability based on discharges in retaliation for refus-
ing to commit illegal acts,7 9 for exercising statutory rights,"0 and for
71. A. HILL, supra note 5, at 26.
72. Brown, supra note 2, at 328.
73. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). Note that this court found the public
policy violation to be a breach of contract. Id. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 26 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), for a case which held the public policy violation to be a tort.
74. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344
P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (citations omitted).
75. Id., 344 P.2d at 27.
76. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980) ("As the Petermann case indicates, an employer's obligation to
refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act... reflects a duty
imposed by law upon all employers to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in
the state's penal statutes. As such, a wrongful discharge suit exhibits the classic elements of a
tort cause of action.").
77. See, e.g., Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839; Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1974); Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425.
78. Brown, supra note 2, at 328; see also A. HILL, supra note 5, at 27. Ethical standards
may also provide a source of public policy. See, e.g., Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
79. See, e.g., Tameny, 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839.
80. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim held to be a violation of public policy).
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threatening to reveal employers' illegal conduct (whistleblowing).81
However, courts usually do not find sufficient public policy when a dis-
missal is for protesting company policies.82
Although some courts define public policy, others defer this deter-
mination to the legislature or jury. 3 A majority of the courts recognize a
middle ground and limit the public policy exception to the at-will doc-
trine to clear expressions of public policy by the legislature.84 In Foley,
the California Supreme Court left open the question "whether a tort ac-
tion alleging a breach of public policy... may be based only on policies
derived from a statute or constitutional provision or whether nonlegisla-
tive sources may provide the basis for such a claim." '85 However, Foley
did assert that when a "statutory touchstone" has been claimed, the
court must still inquire whether the discharge "is against public policy
and affects a duty which inures to the benefit of the public.., rather than
to a particular employee."86
A few courts also recognize claims for intentional or negligent inffic-
tion of emotional distress when the discharge is outrageous,8 7 and some
allow recovery based on theories of traditional tort negligence.88
C. Current Issues in United States Employment Law
United States employment law has become increasingly complex as
different states have recognized or refused to recognize various excep-
tions to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. As California ex-
amples illustrate, the situation within the individual states is not much
clearer. As a result, proposals for both federal and state legislation are
currently being debated. The questions which arise in this context in-
clude: whether to impose a just cause standard on employee termina-
81. See, eg., Sheets, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385.
82. Brown, supra note 2, at 329.
83. Bakaly, supra note 24, at 71-72. New York is a jurisdiction which explicitly rejects
the public policy exception. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
302, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983) (Whether to recognize such tort
liability and how to define it if it is recognized are issues "best and more appropriately explored
and resolved by the legislative branch of our government.").
84. See Bakaly, supra note 24, at 72-73; see also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84
N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1974) (employee could not be terminated for refusing to per-
form an act "that would require a violation of a clear mandate of public policy").
85. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 669, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1988).
86. Id., 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
87. See, eg., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979)
(punitive damages allowed when a managerial agent's use of a racial epithet was outrageous,
was stated with knowing and unreasonable intent to inflict mental distress, and was used posi-
tively to humiliate the plaintiff).
88. See, eg., Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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tions, whether to require mandatory arbitration in wrongful termination
disputes, and whether to allow for punitive damages.8 9 The difficulty lies
in establishing a system which is acceptable to employers who wish to
retain as much control over their enterprises as possible and to employees
who have become accustomed to significantly increased protection from
arbitrary discharge.
A knowledge of foreign systems has become increasingly valuable as
United States legislators and courts attempt to revise the employment
system. Japan's employment system, for example, addresses issues being
contemplated in the United States. Specifically, at a time when Ameri-
can employers are confused as to how much protection employees should
receive, the United States can learn from Japan's highly employee-pro-
tective system.
III. JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT LAW
Japan has created a system described as guaranteeing lifetime em-
ployment.9" The Japanese Constitution, Parliament, and courts have
each contributed to the highly employee-protective atmosphere of the
Japanese employment system.91 Cultural background has also had a
profound influence on the system's emphasis on employee security.92
The Japanese system is relatively new, however, so there is some
confusion among the Japanese courts and people as to the boundaries of
proper termination procedures.9
3
A. Background of Japanese Employment Law
Generally, Japanese labor law applies to all employees as a matter of
principle, regardless of the employer or type of work involved. 94 How-
ever, labor law is normally divided into two separate but frequently over-
lapping areas: individual labor law and collective labor law.95 Japan's
individual labor law can be compared to what is called employment law
in the United States because it addresses the individual relationships be-
89. See supra note 32.
90. See, e.g., Matsuda, The Dismissal of Workers Under Japanese Law, 20 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 455, 455 (1984).
91. See T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 49-51
(1985).
92. See id. at 27; Brown, supra note 2, at 324.
93. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 51.
94. Nishimura, Labor Law, in 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.01[2], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 9
(Kitagawa ed. 1987).
95. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 33.
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tween employers and employees. 96 Its concerns include the different cat-
egories of employees, the individual employment contract (that is, its
form and content), the parties' rights and duties, remuneration, job se-
curity, and protection against discrimination.97 Japan's collective labor
law focuses on the labor unions and regulates the union-employer rela-
tionship.98 As such, only individual labor law is relevant to the following
discussion of wrongful discharge.
Another important distinction in Japanese employment relation-
ships exists between regular, or permanent, employees and temporary
employees. 99 Regular employees are employed under a contract for an
indefinite term but are expected to stay with the employer until retire-
ment.'o They are recruited annually from university and secondary
school graduates. 101 However, there has also been a growing tendency to
employ persons who have worked for other companies as regular em-
ployees. 102 Regular employees "enjoy job security, guaranteed steady ad-
vancement in rank and wages, the required training for a given job and
... a generous sum as a retirement allowance." 10
3
Temporary employees help employers cope with normal business
fluctuations." They are generally experienced workers but may also be
recruited directly from school.105 They are employed for either a definite
or an indefinite term but are not expected to stay in the enterprise for
long. 106 Temporary employees do not have "permanent" status and are
the first to be dismissed in the event of a labor surplus, 10 7 even though in
practice temporary employees may stay with the enterprise for a consid-
erable period of time and, at the employer's discretion, may eventually be
promoted to regular status. 108 Temporary employees have the same legal
protection against dismissal as regular employees. 10 9 In general, how-
96. Id. at 33. See Kristoff, From Labor to Employment Law: The Evolution of a Practice,
10 BARCLAYS CAL. L. MONTHLY, at ii (Aug. 1988), for a discussion of American employment
law's development from a "mini-specialty" within labor law to a "mega-segment of the legal
practice."
97. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 33-34.
98. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.01[2], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 9.
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ever, most large companies still have a steady base of lifetime employees
who enjoy higher status and better working conditions than their tempo-
rary counterparts.1 o
B. Sources of Japanese Labor Law
Japanese statutory law states that an employer may discharge an
employee at will when the employment contract does not specify a defi-
nite term of employment. 11 More specifically, article 627 of the Civil
Code provides:
If no period for the service has been fixed by the parties, either
party may at any time give notice to the other party to terminate the
contract; in such case the contract ... shall come to an end upon the
expiration of two weeks after such notice has been given.' 12
This provision has been interpreted "to permit an employer to ter-
minate [an employment contract] for any reason, or for no reason at all,
when a contract is general or for an indefinite term." '113 Article 627
bears a strong resemblance to California's codification of the United
States at-will rule.' 14 However, the Japanese system has been described
as offering, and even guaranteeing, lifetime or permanent employment," .5
referred to as shushin koyo by the Japanese. 116 The Japanese permanent
employment system "guarantees employment until somewhere between
the ages of fifty-five and sixty.""' 7
The constitutional basis for Japanese labor law appears in the 1946
Constitution's provisions guaranteeing workers' rights as fundamental
human rights."' As fundamental rights, workers' rights are inviolable
and cannot be altered by agreement of the parties. 1 9 Moreover, funda-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The Civil Code of Japan, art. 627, para. 1, in 2 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES: JAPAN,
at FA 104 (1981) [hereinafter Civil Code].
113. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 456. The "at any time" language in Article 627 is limited
by the rest of the article which dictates proper notice of termination. Matsuda notes that in
Japanese, "at any time" may sometimes mean "on whatever occasion" or "in whatever case
may be." As such, Article 627 says, in effect, that termination is acceptable for any or no
reason. Id. at n.2.
114. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 90, at 455.
116. Gould, Labor Law in Japan and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, 6 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 1, 12 (1984).
117. Id.




mental rights constitute public policy. 120
Article 27, section 1 of the Constitution guarantees the right to
work. 2' It is the most fundamental legal source of Japanese labor law
because it gives a constitutional basis to legislation regarding employ-
ment security.122 Section 2 requires that standards of working conditions
be fixed by law, providing another solid ground for protective labor
law.'2 ' Article 28 guarantees the right to organize, bargain, and act
collectively.124
Together, the above constitutional provisions "ensure fairly favour-
able treatment of workers as against employers."' 25 Indeed, "the very
nature of the Constitution provides a favourable atmosphere for labour
law in Japan."' 26
To protect employees' constitutional rights, the Japanese Parliament
enacted legislation shortly after World War 11.127 This legislation, the
Labor Standards Law, modifies article 627 of the Civil Code.1 28 It limits
an employer's right to discharge an employee by protecting constitu-
tional freedoms such as the right to work, by placing employee contracts
under the Rule of Employment and collective bargaining agreements,
and by establishing public policies against discriminatory treatment. 129
When an employer violates a provision of the Labor Standards Law in
discharging an employee, the discharge is invalidated. 30 Additionally,
an employer who violates the Labor Standards Law exposes himself to
criminal penalties.' The provisions also cover basic working condi-
tions, including working hours, rest periods, holidays, and vacations. 13
2
Employers entering into agreements setting standards lower than those
prescribed by the Labor Standards Law will have those standards ren-
dered null and void and may be punished by fines.
133
120. Id. at 35.
121. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES 8 (1958) ("All people shall
have the right and the obligation to work.").
122. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 49.
123. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES, supra note 121, at 8.
124. Id.
125. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 49.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 456 n.l.
129. See generally Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[1][a], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 59-60.
130. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 459.
131. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[l][a], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 59-60; see also Labor Standards
Law, art. 13, in 8 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES: JAPAN, supra note 112, at EA 2 (1983).
132. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[1][a], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 59.
133. Id. at 59-60; see also T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 35. The civil law rules regarding
contracts of employment also cover individual employer-employee relationships. Id. at 33.
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The Labor Standards Law encompasses nearly all employed per-
sons, except for civil servants, family businesses, and a few other limited
exceptions.1 34 It also applies to the foreign managers and foreign em-
ployees of foreign companies registered in Japan.13 5
In short, the Labor Standards Law attempts to eliminate exploita-
tive practices that impede the formation of equitable employment rela-
tionships. 1 6  The overall effect of the Labor Standards Law is that,
"while it may appear otherwise, the employer has no real freedom to
discharge employees."' 137
Case law is necessary to fill out those generally abstract legislative
provisions that tend to prescribe only fundamental rules.' 38 However,
the relative newness of both the theory and practice of labor law in Japan
has caused confusion in the case law. 139 Almost any legal argument will
be heard by the court, with young judges tending to adopt new
theories. 140
However, courts generally follow rules that have been firmly estab-
lished in reported cases,' 4 1 and judges pay close attention to scholarly
legal work and reviews of court decisions published in legal journals. 142
Thus, even though there is no notion of binding precedent or stare decisis
in Japanese law, 13 Japanese case decisions have some predictive value.
It is important to note that Japanese culture substantially influences
the tone of Japanese employment law."4 Japan is a country which re-
tains "traditional social values such as respect for the aged, diligence,
sensibility, and modesty, and combine[s] them with the modem demo-
cratic ideas [of western culture, such] as the freedom of the individual...
and the guarantee of fundamental human rights."' 4 5 In addition, "[t]he
Japanese system of loyalty and cooperation tends to promote job stability
However, labor laws modify or replace contract rules to such an extent that the contract rules
apply to only a few exceptional employment relationships. Kitagawa, Contract Law In Gen-
eral, in 3 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 94, § 1.06[7][a], pt. 2, ch. 1, at 73.22.
134. Nishimura, supra note 94, §§ 1.01[3][a], 1.03[1][b], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 9, 60.
135. Id. § 1.01[1][b], at 60.
136. Id. § 1.03[l][a], at 59-60.
137. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 455.
138. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 51.
139. Id. This newness also explains the relatively small number of judicial decisions con-
cerning labor law. See Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.01[3][c], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 10.




144. See infra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
145. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 27.
[Vol. 13
Wrongful Termination Law
and, to a certain degree, permanent employment." 146 The resulting em-
ployment system is extremely protective of employee rights.
C. Wrongful Discharge In Japan
Article 27 of the Constitution, which makes the right to work a fun-
damental right of Japanese citizens, "make[s] the promotion of job secur-
ity a matter of public order."' 47 Japanese courts usually hold that
employers "must respect this public order and not abuse their rights of
dismissal."' 48 That is, the courts do not favor dismissal and often require
just cause even for dismissal with notice.' 4 9 Additionally, there are a
number of specific statutory restrictions on the employer's power to dis-
charge employees.150 In short, the Constitution, courts, and statutes re-
flect the "extraordinary nature of the dismissal of regular employees
under the life-time employment system."''
The Labor Standards Law, discussed above, provides that an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against an employee by discharging him be-
cause of his nationality, beliefs, or social status. 152 It also prohibits
employers from retaliating against employees by dismissing them for ex-
ercising their right to file complaints against their employers. 53 More-
over, the Labor Standards Law dictates that there are certain periods
during which an employer may not discharge an employee.' 54 For exam-
ple, an employer may not dismiss a female employee while she is on leave
for pregnancy,155 or an employee that is undergoing medical treatment
for a work related illness or injury, or within thirty days after such treat-
ment ceases. 156  However, it remains an open question whether an em-
ployer may discharge an employee who commits misconduct during one
of these periods. 5 7
146. Brown, supra note 2, at 324.
147. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 85.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See infra notes 152-161 and accompanying text.
151. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 85.
152. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 3, at EA 2.
153. Id. art. 104, para. 2, at EA 28.
154. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][b][ii], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 112.
155. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, arts. 19, 65, at EA 7, EA 16.
156. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 19, at EA 7.
157. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][b][ii], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 112. Nishimura notes that
one case has held that disciplinary discharge during this period is impermissible, but that it is
permissible to give notice of intent to discharge during the period when discharge is impermis-
sible. Id. (citing Judgment of Sept. 13, 1956, Chisai (District Court), Japan, 7 Raminshil 1048).
Such a discharge would become effective once the period prescribed for notice of discharge
after the restriction has passed. Id.
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Significantly, an employer must give an employee at least thirty days
advance notice of discharge." 8 Dismissal may be oral or in writing.'5 9
The lack of any required form for notice has given the courts some
trouble in determining the date of the notice.' 60 Employers are most pro-
tected if they give notice in writing, accompanied with the reason for the
dismissal. 161
The period of notice may be reduced by paying the discharged em-
ployee an allowance in proportion to the amount of days cut off from the
thirty-day requisite period.162 Accordingly, an employer who only gives
twenty days notice must pay an allowance of ten days wages to the dis-
charged employee. The practice of shortening the notice period can be
controversial. 63 For example, when an employer dismisses an employee
with neither proper notice nor the average wages for thirty days of work,
the courts have been unclear as to whether the dismissal is void or
whether the contract is ended after thirty days, leaving the employee
with a claim for thirty days' wages.'I4 According to administrative inter-
pretation,165 immediate discharge without cause becomes actionable once
the period prescribed for notice of discharge has passed, or upon pay-
ment of allowance in lieu of notice, whichever occurs first.' 6 6 Some com-
mentators feel the discharge should be void. Others feel that the
discharged employee can either claim the discharge is void due to the
absence of notice or demand payment of the allowance in lieu of the
notice.' 6 7 A number of court decisions have adopted the latter view.'6 8
The Labor Standards Law does not specifically require that the
thirty day notice be accompanied by a reason for discharge. 69 However,
Japanese courts are strict in requiring reasons for dismissal, regardless of
whether the employer has given proper notice to the employee.17 0
158. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 20, para. 1, at EA 7.
159. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 87.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 20, para. 1, at EA 7.
163. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 87.
164. Id.
165. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][b][iv], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 114. The term "adminis-
trative interpretation" describes directives from the upper levels of labor ministries and admin-
istrative organs regarding policies for the interpretation and application of statutes and
administrative orders. Id. § 1.01[3][b], at 10.
166. Id. § 1.03[10][b][iv], at 114.
167. Id. at 115.
168. Id. (citing Judgment of Apr. 23, 1966, Chisai (District Court), Japan, 17 R6minshil
627).




There are specific instances when the time restrictions on discharge
do not apply. 171 An employer may discharge an employee without notice
or payment of an allowance when it has become impossible to continue
business because of some natural disaster, emergency, or other inevitable
reason,172 or when discharge is based upon a cause for which the em-
ployee is responsible.' 73 The "inevitable reason" must be beyond the em-
ployer's control and must occur so suddenly that he cannot avoid it
under normal circumstances and cannot give proper notice.' 74 As for a
discharge for which an employee is responsible, proper grounds include
theft, misappropriation of funds, infliction of injury upon another em-
ployee, commission of other criminal acts at the workplace, disruption of
order at the workplace, and exertion of bad influence upon other employ-
ees.175 Before the employer acts under any of these exceptions, he or she
must obtain approval from the Labor Standards Office. 176 Without ap-
proval, the dismissal is null and void.177 Many reported decisions hold,
however, that such discharges are effective without Labor Standards Of-
fice certification if cause did indeed exist. 178
Employment rules are another significant aspect of the Japanese
wrongful termination system. Employment rules are regulations provid-
ing for the terms and conditions of employment. 179 The "employment
rules play an overwhelmingly important role in Japan in the establish-
ment of terms and conditions of employment and in the maintenance of
order at the workplace."' 80 All employers with ten or more employees
are required to establish such rules. 181 Employers must ifie the rules with
administrative agencies and make the contents of the rules known to em-
171. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][b][ii], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 112-13.
172. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 19, para. 1, at EA 7. Article 628 of the
Civil Code allows an employer to terminate an employment contract immediately and without
notice for "unavoidable cause." The Labor Standards Law requirement of an "inevitable rea-
son," as compared to the Civil Code requirement of an "unavoidable cause," has been inter-
preted to be a much narrower and tighter restriction on an employer's ability to terminate
without notice. An "inevitable reason" is said to be a bit broader than an act of God but much
narrower than traditional notions of just cause. See T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 57, 87-88;
Matsuda, supra note 90, at 457.
173. Labor Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 20, para. 1, at EA 7.
174. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 88.
175. Nishimura, supra note 94, § l.03[l0][b][iv], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 114.
176. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 88.
177. See Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][b][ iv], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 113-14 (citing Labor
Standards Law, supra note 131, art. 20, para. 3, at EA 7).
178. Id.at 114-15.
179. Id. § 1.03[9][a], at 105-06.
180. Id. at 106.
181. Id. § 1.03[9][b].
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ployees.' 82 The rules "must not controvert provisions of statutes or ad-
ministrative orders or the collective agreement." 183 Any provisions in a
labor contract fixing terms and conditions of employment which are in-
ferior to the standards set forth in the employment rules are void and
substituted by the standards set forth in the employment rules. 84
Significantly, "[v]irtually all employers include a dismissal clause in
their 'rules of employment,' which specify the conditions for which an
employee may be discharged."' 85 Since rules of employment "are re-
quired for every firm with ten or more employees.., most employees are
protected by such [dismissal clauses.]" '186 Usually, these clauses not only
specify causes for discharge, but describe behavior giving rise to discipli-
nary charges as well. 187 The rules are generally considered both self-
imposed limitations on employers' power to discharge their employees 188
and specified grounds for disciplinary action by employers.189 Indeed, a
majority of courts hold that discharge for causes not enumerated in the
rules of employment is impermissible. 190
Another protection afforded Japanese employees is found in the
Civil Code's proscription upon abuse of rights.' 9 ' The majority of com-
mentators and reported cases hold that the prohibition upon abuse of
rights curtails the right to discharge, even though technically the em-
ployer may discharge employees as long as statutory and nonstatutory
restrictions are followed.' 92 Under this view, an employer's exercise of
his right to discharge must not be abusive. 1 "The [Japanese] Supreme
Court has announced that even when cause for discharge exists, dis-
charge is void as an abuse of right when it is markedly unreasonable and
cannot be approved in the concrete circumstances of the case under no-
tions prevailing in society."' 94 Thus, although Japan lacks a statute re-
182. Id. § 1.03[9][a].
183. Id. § 1.03[9][e], at 108.
184. Id. § 1.03[9][f], at 108-09.
185. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 461.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 461-62.
189. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 89.
190. See Matsuda, supra note 90, 113, at 462 n.25; see also Nishimura, supra note 94,
§ 1.03[10][c][ii], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 115.
191. See Civil Code, supra note 112, art. 1, para. 3, at FA 1 ("No abusing of rights is
permissible."). The Civil Code is unclear as to which rights it addresses. It is safe to assume,
however, that one may not abuse those rights guaranteed in the Japanese Constitution.
192. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][c][iii], pt. 12, cl. 1, at 116.
193. Id.




quiring just cause for dismissal with notice, legal theory has firmly
established strict rules concerning dismissal with notice, e.g. that dis-
charges inappropriate under prevailing societal norms will be an abuse of
right. 195 Simplified, when an abusive exercise of an employer's power to
discharge is at issue, the abuse consists of a violation of public policy, a
violation of good faith, and abuse in a narrow sense. 196
"In sum, [Japanese] law uses two approaches to restrict employers'
dismissals of employees: it prohibits [employers'] abuse of [their] discre-
tion to discharge, and it encourages [them] to discharge only for reasons
stated in the rules of employment." 197 The employer will generally be
obligated to give some reasonable or just cause sufficiently justifying the
dismissal.1 9 As shown,
unless an employer can provide a justifiable reason, a discharge for
cause other than [those] included in the rules of employment shall be
invalidated as an abuse of the employer's power to discharge. Yet,
even when a discharge is within the terms of the rules of employment,
it will be held invalid if such a cause is found either unreasonable or
contrary to public policy, or if an application or an interpretation of
the rule is found unreasonable.199
D. Remedies
Once a court finds an employee has been invalidly dismissed, it will
declare the dismissal null and void and may order the continuance of the
employment contract."° Accordingly, a Japanese employee who has
195. Id.; see also T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 88-89. Note, however, that "the predictive
value of reported decisions is limited" because of subtle distinctions made by the courts.
Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][c][iii], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 116. For example, courts have
found abuses of the right to discharge when a female employee was discharged because she
made erroneous entries in account books and had personal telephone conversations during
work hours and when a salesman went to a coffee shop during work hours; however, other
courts have found no abuse of right when an employee was discharged for misrepresenting his
education in a statement of his personal history and when an instructor in a mission school was
discharged for not participating in required worship services. Id. at 117-18 (citing Judgment of
Nov. 20, 1967, Chisai (District Court), Japan, 617 Hanji 72; Judgment of Oct. 9, 1970, Chisai
(District Court), Japan, 617 Hanji 92; Judgment of June 11, 1969, Chisai (District Court),
Japan, 569 Hanji 85; Judgment of Mar. 31, 1966, Chisai (District Court), Japan, 17 Rominshu
347.
196. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 461 n.22 (citing Konishi, Freedom of Discharge Hogaku
Kyokai Zasshi, [86 No. 9] HOGAKU KYOKAI ZASSHI 1028).
197. Id. at 462.
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis in original).
200. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 85.
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been invalidly discharged may be reinstated2' unless he chooses instead
to claim damages.20 2 Most employees choose to be reinstated, in part
because the Japanese lifetime employment system carries with it the idea
that a second job is inferior to the first and also because of the need of
Japanese employees to "save face" with their former employers.20 3
If the employer refuses to reinstate the employee, the question arises
whether the employee has a cause of action against the employer for rein-
statement or for damages. 2°  The majority of commentators argue that
the employee has no right to demand reinstatement unless such remedy
is provided for in the collective agreement, employment rules, or labor
contract.20 5 Still other commentators hold that employees have the right
to demand reinstatement because the "labor contract is a continuing con-
tractual relationship which is governed by the principles of fidelity and
good faith. 2 6
Aside from these remedies, the Civil Code mandates the retroactive
payment of wages for the time the employer wrongfully refused to accept
the employee's services.20 7 The reasoning behind this remedy is that
when the dismissal is invalid, the employee has never legally left the em-
ployer's payroll.20 8 However, some Japanese scholars are skeptical of
this remedy, believing that a damages award is more consistent with the
principle of freedom of termination of an employment contract. 209
Although Japan does not have specific labor courts, the courts have
developed a provisionary disposition procedure which caters specifically
to employer-employee disputes.210 An order resulting from the provi-
sionary disposition procedure preserves a claim by ordering specific ac-
tion to be taken or by fixing the parties' legal status until a formal court
201. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 464.
202. T. HANAMI, supra note 91, at 85.
203. Id. Hanami questions the effectiveness of the reinstatement remedy, noting that rein-
stated workers often move on to new jobs because of the damage done to their relationships
with management and fellow employees. Id.
204. Nishimura, supra note 94, § 1.03[10][f], pt. 12, ch. 1, at 121.
205. Id. at 121-22.
206. Id. at 122.
207. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 464-65 (citing The Civil Code of Japan, supra note 112, art.
536, para. 2, at FA 89).
208. Id. at 465.
209. Id. at n.35. Critics of the retroactive wage remedy also point to the problems inherent
in trying to distinguish between legal and effective termination of an employment contract. Id.
at n.36. Moreover, these critics feel that damages are more practical since an employee cannot
seek court enforcement of an invalidation of discharge. Id. at n.37.
210. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 465. Note that the resolution of industrial disputes in-
volves different machinery, such as the Labor Relations Commission. See T. HANAMI, supra
note 91, at 152-62.
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settlement.211  The provisionary disposition proceeding is thus
subordinate to a full consideration of a case on its merits.212 The party
seeking a provisionary disposition must show that he or she will suffer
irreparable damage if forced to wait for a decision on the merits and that
the prima facie case is strong enough to suggest that the ultimate decision
will be in the party's favor.213
The majority of the Japanese courts, in provisionary disposition pro-
ceedings, tend to grant orders that both restore the plaintiff's employee
status and require the employer to pay wages to the employee.214 Em-
ployees are therefore more likely to petition for provisionary orders than
to file suits alleging wrongful discharge. 215 Furthermore, although a
court action on the merits can overrule a provisionary disposition order,
the provisionary proceeding is simpler, faster, and cheaper than a court
action.21 6 Courts now tend to grant provisionary disposition orders that
automatically invalidate discharges without stating any reasons for the
invalidations, partly in response to the ideal of voluntary dispute
resolution.217
Some courts, however, are unwilling to issue provisionary disposi-
tion orders that completely satisfy the employee thus making further liti-
gation unnecessary.2 I8 Unless the procedure appears urgent, these courts
usually reject petitions for provisionary orders to pay wages, 219 choosing
instead to grant orders suspending the discharge in question, thereby ten-
tatively restoring the employee's status under the employment con-
tract.220 To a discharged Japanese employee, the provisionary order
restoring his status in the company is still important because it lessens
the social disgrace involved and allows the worker to claim benefits in
addition to wages.2 21 Moreover, the courts, expecting the employer's
voluntary compliance, believe that such a result promotes dispute
resolution.222
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Basic similarities between the Japanese and United States employ-
ment systems make the Japanese system a good predictive tool for evolv-
ing United States law. Both systems have developed considerably in the
decades since the end of World War 11.223 Although the Japanese system
favors lifetime employment over an at-will presumption, Japan, like the
United States, lacks explicit statutory or constitutional authority for a
just cause requirement for employment termination.224 Japanese courts
have imposed this limitation on the employers' right to discharge work-
ers.225 Similarly, in California, the courts have moved toward a just
cause standard.226 In short, the United States view of the employer-em-
ployee relationship is moving closer to a Japanese perspective in that
United States courts are increasingly concerned with employee protec-
tion against wrongful discharge.
Despite the similarities, differences between the two countries' ap-
proaches to disputes in general make it unlikely that the systems will
become mirror images of each other. For example, in Japan "many mat-
ters which in Western nations are dealt with within the framework of the
regular machinery of the law are left.., to work themselves out outside
this machinery. ' 227 This is due, in part, to the Japanese preference for
extrajudicial, informal means of settling controversies.22 To the Japa-
nese, litigation admits that a dispute exists and leads to a decision in-
dependent of the wills of the disputants.229 Because of this approach to
disputes, "the Japanese are still adjusting to the American victim's ten-
dency to litigate and to seek punitive as well as compensatory
damages. 230
A difference in the historical backgrounds of the United States and
Japanese legal systems also leads to differences in the two employment
223. See id. at 455; A. HILL, supra note 5, at 9.
224. Matsuda, supra note 90, at 455 (quoting Civil Code, supra note 112, art. 627, at FA
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systems.231 United States law "is in large part a result of the people's
efforts from the colonial period to develop an official scheme for solving
disputes among themselves., a 32 By contrast, "Japanese law is basically a
means developed by the rulers to rule the people. ' 233 As such, the Japa-
nese courts were considered machinery for the ruler to rule the people
and not forums for the people to rectify wrongs committed against
them. 234
The Japanese system, however, is still of theoretical value to the
United States. By observing Japan's lifetime employment system at
work, United States lawmakers can better evaluate the desirablility of a
similar system in the United States. Similarly, by identifying those areas
where confusion has persisted in Japanese law, United States lawmakers
will be better equipped to avoid the same results.
V. CONCLUSION
Apart from any similarities or differences between the United States
and Japanese employment systems, the American and Japanese peoples
continue to conduct business with one another. Given the confusing
state of United States employment law and the unique aspects of Japa-
nese employment law, a basic knowledge of each other's employment
systems has become a practical necessity to those employers and employ-
ees who find themselves in the other's employment systems. As Japanese
and American employers' knowledge and understanding of each other's
systems increases, so will the efficiency and strength of their existing and
future business relationships.
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